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Discovery Practice in Ohio-
Pathway to Progress
By Edwin F. Woodle
INTRODUCMON
THE VAST body of the substantive law, whether embodied i statutory
enactments or pronounced by judicial fiat, has at all times -had for its
avowed purpose the accomplishment of a just and equitable result in
every type of controversy and conflict The great body of the English
common law and the maxims of equity which together constitute the
foundation of American jurisprudence have never sought less than the
accomplishment of justice grounded upon principles of general morality.
In the application of those principles, courts of every jurisdiction have
been constantly adjured to
bear in mind the attain-
THE AuTmoR (A.B., 1923, Western Reserve, ment of a result conso-
LL.B., 1925, Western Reserve) is a practacing
attorney ia Cleveland, Ohio. He is Past-Presi- nanr with the sole and en-
dent of the Cuyahoga County Bar Association, tirely justified purpose of
and former Chairman of the Pre-Trial Practice the principles of juris-
Committee. prudence.
"Office" lawyers, hay-
ing a sound and general knowledge of the body of the law, may guide
and direct their clients' affairs, so skillfully prepare their business and
personal documents, and so adroitly manipulate their decisions that they
may successfully steer them away from the shoals and quicksands of litiga-
tion. But the real glory of the law is or should be, the application of
these principles of law and equity to the just and sound determination of
controversies by the courts.
The task of the courts in this regard has been made difficult by many
considerations, two of which are particularly significant. Within this
century, the formulation by legislative bodies and administrative agencies
of an imposing - not to say harassing - body of rules and regulations
governing every aspect of commercial transactions, and many personal
problems as well, has prevented the courts from deciding a large number
of controversies upon any other than a dogmatic or arbitrary basis, with
no regard for the fitness or justice of the result. The opportunity - nay,
the necessity, of deciding so many cases in this manner appears to have
engendered in many courts a callousness with respect to the rightness and
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the justice of their decisions, so that today this constitutes a marked and
most fortunate development in the trend of so-called "judge-made" law.
The second consideration, which for many years stood in the way of ac-
complishing the kind of result in each case which the law does, and should
intend, will be found in the perverse and tangled skein of procedural law
and practice. Surely, it was never the intention of the learned gentlemen
who, over the centuries, have announced, re-announced, modified, altered
and, on occasion, substantially improved the rules of procedural law, that
these rules should ever do anything other than assist the parties to a law-
suit and, in the final analysis, the court or the jury in arriving at that re-
suit which, again, it is the object of all jurisprudence to accomplish.
Sadly, history records that in fact the rules of practice and procedure
have created so many stumbling blocks and so many pitfalls, so many
technical traps and so many paths that lead away from the real subject
of controversy, that for many years it has been impossible - and is still
impossible - for litigants in an astonishingly large number of cases ac-
tually to have their day in court and to secure a just determination of
their case upon the merits. Perhaps some justification or excuse, inade-
quate though it may be, can be found for the creation of such legal pitfalls
in the development of the rules of pleading, in defining the jurisdiction
of courts, or in acquiescing to the regulations pronounced by the courts
themselves for the government of their daily affairs. Perhaps the "quib-
bling" of lawyers is one of their minor vices and, after all, judges are only
lawyers appearing on the superior side of the bench. When one ap-
proaches the facet of procedural law with which this article is concerned,
however, it is difficult to find any justification or excuse for the short-
sighted and inept manner in which the courts -both at law and in equity
- have devised and applied principles designated sometimes as legal and
sometimes as equitable, and not infrequently with the most obvious shrug
of the judicial shoulders and an utter callousness toward the particular
result.
It should be a platitude and it is, at least, an observation that receives
lip service from the bench, that no proper result can be accomplished in
any case unless all of the facts are before the court. Undoubtedly this
observation never has been intended to embrace simply those matters
which,,for want of a better term, the courts refer to as the ultimate facts.
The ultimate facts, as every trial lawyer understands, constitute simply the
end result of what he is attempting to demonstrate as the truth in the
case. When it is said that a case cannot be properly and justly decided
unless all of the facts are before the court, it is dearly intended that each
of the parties to the lawsuit must be able to present every witness who, by
relevant testimony, can shed light upon one or more of the ultimate
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factual issues in dispute, and all documentary evidence which, properly
identified, can serve the same purpose. This being so, one would sup-
pose that in pronouncing and in applying legal and equitable principles in
the field of discovery, the courts would constantly bear in mind what
they themselves have stated to be necessary in order to arrive at the proper
determination of a lawsuit. Alas, anyone boldly approaching the subject
of discovery and confident that he will find the rules announced and ap-
plied consistently with the declared object of litigation is due for a rude
awakening. This is particularly true in the great State of Ohio.
An attempt will be made here to undertake a reasonably thorough
examination of the law in the field of discovery practice and procedure
as it affects the lawyers of the State of Ohio. And, since Ohio lawyers,
like those of every other state, are not only privileged but, in many in-
stances, required to practice in the federal courts whose territorial jurisdic-
tion includes the State of Ohio, this examination will be extended to in-
clude discovery practice and procedure not only in the state courts, but
in the federal courts as well.
HISTORICAL PERsPECIVE
Webster's multi-volume New International Dictionary defines dis-
covery as the "act, fact, process or instance of discovering as: a) finding
out or ascertaining something previously unknown or unrecognized;
c) laying open or exposing to view; d) formerly, exploration; investiga-
tion;" - and, says Webster, in "Law- in practice, the disclosure by party
to an action or proceeding of facts or documents which will afford ma-
terial evidence in determining the rights of the party asking it."1 Inade-
quate as this definition may be in the light of modern discovery practice
and procedure, it will be found that many Ohio courts have not yet
achieved even the dictionary level of its meaning.
It should be made clear at this point that this discussion of discovery
practice and procedure, as it is and as we believe it should be, will not
be confined to the type of action, whether statutory and at law, or equita-
ble and commonly referred to as a bill of discovery. The various en-
cyclopedic compendia of the law - American Jurisprudence, Corpus
Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum, among others - discuss the subject
of discovery in the light of an attempt on the part of one party to a law-
suit to obtain information from the opposite party. The various methods
by which this may be accomplished will be discussed. Equally important,
however, are the methods of securing necessary or helpful information
from a third person who neither is, nor will be, a party to the litigation in
connection with which the information is desired.
12 WBBsTE's Nnw INTBRNATmONAL DIcTIONARY 745 (2nd ed. 1955).
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Available to Ohio lawyers in all courts of the state are many remedies:
(1) the ancient equitable proceeding or bill of discovery;
(2) a parallel statutory proceeding in discovery;
(3) the right to examine witnesses in detail by way of deposition;
(4) the right to cross-examine any other party to pending litigation;
(5) the right to propound to an opposing party written interroga-
tories whether attached to a pleading or entirely independent
thereof;
(6) the right to a physical examination or inspection whenever the
results of such an examination or inspection are relevant to an
issue before the court;
(7) the right to demand, to receive copies of and to inspect docu-
ments in the hands of an opposing party or a third person rele-
vant to the issue in the case.
The problem with which lawyers are currently faced in the courts of Ohio,
and the handicaps which exist, result not so much from the absence of
procedural rights as from the manner in which the courts of Ohio have
interpreted, restricted and restrained the application of those rights. On
the other hand, when practicing before the various federal courts situated
within the state, there are available to the lawyers of Ohio the very broad
and liberal provisions of deposition and discovery procedure embodied in
what may no longer be referred to as the "new" federal rules of civil pro-
cedure.
In order to understand the situation confronting Ohio lawyers in dis-
covery practice and procedure, to point out some of the errors and fal-
lacies in the thinking of the courts on this subject, and to indicate what
needs to be done - by way of legislation if necessary, to accomplish a
proper and just result, it is necessary to undertake an historical excursion:
The common law generally allowed litigant parties to conceal from
each other, up to the time of trial, the evidence on which they meant to
rely, and would not compel either of them to supply the other with any
evidence, parol or otherwise, to assist him in the conduct of his cause.
Hence there was failure of justice at common law, and hence there arose
the equitable remedy of bills for discovery, which was made use of simply
for the purpose of assisting or supplementing the plaintiff's remedy at com-
mon law.'
We beseech the patience of the reader to such historical data as may
here be included and commend it to his careful attention. It may even,
on occasion, be employed with telling effect in arguing for or against a
particular attempt to procure a discovery of inportant facts. Depending
"Reynolds v. Burgess Sulphite Fiber Co., 71 N.H. 332, 334, 51 Ad. 1075, 1076
(1902). See also Pidgeon v. Yeager, 23 Ohio Op. 533, 9 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Re-
porter) 3 (1942).
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upon which side of the controversy counsel may find himself, he may
emphasize the great weight to be accorded to established principles sup-
ported by almost two centuries of practice. Or he may -urge that rules
standing in the way of a complete discovery of the facts, based upon
concepts hoary with age and myopic in outlook have, in recent years
through widely accepted reforms, succeeded in changing the entire course
of litigation and in investing the trial of lawsuits with a new vigor and
a wider vision.
The historical basis for proceedings in discovery cannot, however, be
forgotten for the courts, in Ohio at least, will not permit it to be for-
gotten. The reader will find that among the cases in this field which
have been reported within the past fifteen years, many have adopted a
modern and liberal approach to the particular problem before the court.
Unfortunately they are paralleled by others in which the particular judge
relied heavily on statements of principles which now, and rightfully so,
are more honored in their breach than in their observance. The tendency
of some courts, as indicated, to revert to procedural practices which have
been generally shown to be neither justified nor adequate is most un-
fortunate. Presumably it results in great part from the tenacious hold
upon the legal profession maintained by the doctrine of stare decisis.
Since a discussion of the merits of that doctrine might call for an artide
in itself considerably longer than this, it should suffice to point out here
that the doctrine has no genuine merit except in limited instances e-
yond the realm of substantive law. When a rule of procedure or a rule
of practice having its origin and foundation solely in judicial pronounce-
ments is, upon further and careful analysis, found to be unsound, inade-
quate or inappropriate in the light of changing circumstances, or requires
interpretation and application in the light of such changing circum-
stances, neither counsel nor litigant has any right to expect the court to
adhere unrelentingly to ancient processes on the -basis of stare decisis.
When procedural halters and blinders have been created by the court, it
is for the court itself in an appropriate case to remove them.
The great epithet of opprobrium which was constantly hurled against
attempts at discovery in the early 18th century was a cry of "fishing
expedition." The concept that such an excursion was beyond even the
pale of equity died hard. And even today the elusive ghosts spawned
by that concept rise to plague the lawyers in the courts of Ohio. The
principles giving rise to this concept will be found didactically enunciated
by no less an authority than the Supreme Court of the United States as
late as the year 1911.
A bill of discovery cannot be used merely for the purpose of enabling
the plaintiff in such a bill to pry into the case of his adversary to learn its
1957]
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strength or weakness. A discovery sought upon suspicion, surmise or vague
guesses is called a "fishing bill" and will be dismissed. Such a bill must
seek only evidence which is material to the support of the complainant's
own case and prying into the nature of his adversary's case will not be
tolerated The plaintiff in equity is entitled only to the discovery of
such matters in the knowledge or possession of the defendant in equity as
will enable him to make out his own case at law!
BILLS OF DIsCOvERY IN EQUITY
There is one Ohio case, Chapmatz v. Lee,4 which is without question
the granddaddy of all reported decisions in the State of Ohio in the field
of discovery practice and procedure. This case, decided in 1887, has
been subsequently cited and relied upon more than any other in the
development of the rules expounding and impinging upon the right to
the discovery of facts and of evidence.
There was in that case only a single issue before the Supreme Court
of Ohio which, on its face, appears to have little, if any, relationship to
the substantive right of a party to the benefits of discovery procedure
or to the scope and extent of such discovery. That issue was framed by
the supreme court in the following language:
This court is called upon to determine but one question: Did the Court
of Appeals err in dismissing the appeal of Chapman and Tracy? If the
parties had the right in the Court of Common Pleas to demand a jury,
then the case was not appealable; if they had no such right, then the case
was appealable, and the appeal was improperly dismissed
The facts of the case have a special interest for lawyers. The plaintiffs
were attorneys who had entered into a written agreement with one of the
defendants in the case to prosecute an action for damages on his account
against a railway company, which was also named as a defendant. The
agreement provided that the plaintiffs were to be compensated for their
services on a contingent basis.
The plaintiffs prosecuted the action against the railway company with
due diligence and procured a judgment in excess of $12,000.00, which,
however, was subsequently reversed and the case was remanded for a new
trial.
Following the remand, counsel for the railway company undertook to
negotiate with plaintiffs' client a settlement of the action for damages
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. After the settlement had thus
been negotiated, counsel for the railway company produced the settle-
ment agreement in open court, and over the objection of the plaintiffs
procured a dismissal of the damage suit.
'Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
'45 Ohio St 356, 13 N.E. 736 (1887).
'Id. at 362, 363, 13 N.E. at 738.
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The railway alleged the amount of the settlement to be $5,000.00.
The plaintiffs asserted that in fact the amount was substantially greater
than appeared in the written settlement agreement, and that their client
and the railway company -had conspired to defraud them out of a large
part of the fee to which they were entitled under the settlement agree-
ment.
It was asserted that at the time the settlement was made their client
was insolvent and remained insolvent and that this circumstance was also
known to the railway company. The plaintiffs asserted that they did not
know the exact and correct athount of the settlement but that, under the
circumstances, they were entitled to a full discovery from the defendants
of all of the facts regarding the settlement and the consideration for the
same in whatever guise it may have been received. The plaintiffs then
alleged that they were entitled to have an accounting of the full amount
due them under the contract with the defendant client, and prayed for a
judgment for the amount found due.
Upon a consideration of these facts and the allegations of the peti-
tion, the supreme court determined that either of the parties -to the action
had a right to demand a jury, and that the case was therefore not an
equity case notwithstanding the prayer for discovery and accounting, as
well as for money judgment.
In order to arrive at its decision, the court was required to determine
only the nature of the action and "the primary object sought." The court
declared that the gist of the action brought by the plaintiff attorneyss
was a charge of a fraudulent combination between the defendants to
deceive the plaintiffs concerning the real terms of the settlement of the
pending lawsuit, and the further claim that money which belonged to the
plaintiffs had been wrongfully appropirated by the defendants.
Having arrived at a determination of this question, which was, in
fact, the sole question before the court, it then proceeded to discuss at
considerable length the historical development of suits for discovery and
the effect of the rather recently enacted statutory provision. As to this
the court declared:
Suits for discovery were, in equity practice auxiliary proceedings,
brought not to obtain any equitable remedy, nor to establish any equitable
right, but to aid in maintaining a legal right, and in prosecuting actions
pending, or to be brought, in a court of law.
If a party could not succeed without the aid of facts within the per-
sonal knowledge of his adversary, he might file his bill, setting forth all the
facts within his knowledge and adding interrogatories which the other
party was required to answer fully under oath
The court then pointed out various provisions in the Ohio Code of Civil
1Id. at 365, 13 N.E. at 740. 1
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Procedure, by virtue of which a plaintiff in a case was said to be afforded
"all the aid which a suit for discovery would give." Under these code
provisions, the court said, either party could attach to his pleading in-
terrogatories which, so far as pertinent, the other party would be bound to
answer, and the answers given could be used by either party as evidence.
The court then continued with the following assertion, which 'has been
the source of endless trouble and confusion ever since:
The doctrine and rules concerning the .subject matter of discovery
established by courts of equity are believed to be still in force and to control
the same matters in the new procedure, but the bill of discovery as a
separate action, is practically obsolete in this state. (Emphasis added) .
This was clearly and purely a gratuitous comment, since no claim had
been made by either of the parties that the action then before the court
was an independent action in discovery, or a bill of discovery, and the
proposition had not even been argued by counsel. Moreover, the state-
ment of the court was further erroneous, in view of the fact that the court
overlooked an Ohio statute which "had been enacted 30 years earlier, pro-
viding in essense by statutory enactment for the filing of an independent
bill of discovery.
True enough, the statute did not expressly declare the remedy to be
one in equity. In that regard, however, it was not a bit different from
the many other statutes enacted in Ohio affording various types of equita-
ble relief or procedure as, for example, those relating to the issuance of
injunctions or providing for procedure in ejectment. Nevertheless, this
pronouncement, which was not only obiter dicta but without any proper
foundation, was carried into the third paragraph of the syllabus of the
case, in the following language:
Adequate means of obtaining discovery from parties to actions at
law being afforded by our statute, suits for discovery, as prosecuted in
equity before the adoption of the code, are practically obsolete in this state.8
It appears from the many decisions citing, relying upon and applying
the case of Chapman v. Lee, that many trial and appellate courts have
'been inclined to a strict rather than a liberal application of the rules of
discovery practice, in the light of the belief that they were dealing with
a legal rather than with an equitable remedy.
The absence of any proper basis for such a belief will be found in an
established rule applied by the Supreme Court of *the United States in the
case of Carpenter v. Winn,' in which the Court declared that:
7 Id. at 366, 13 N.E. at 740.
8id. at 357, 13 N.E. at 736 (syllabus).
9221 U.S. 533, 539 (1911)
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A court of equity does not lose its jurisdiction to entertain a bill for
the discovery of evidence or to enjoin the trial at law until obtained be-
cause the powers of the courts of law have been enlarged so as to make
the equitable remedy unnecessary in some circumstances.
A further pronouncement and exposition of the correct rule, which
was entirely overlooked by the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Chap-
man v. Lee, but which received the stamp of approval of the Supreme
Court of the United States, is to be found in the decision and opinion of
the federal court of appeals in the case of Colgate v. Compagnme Francatse
du Telegrapbhe,'0 in which that court observed:
The jurisdiction in equity for discovery originated in the absence of
power in courts of law to compel a discovery by their own process, either
by means of the oath of a party or by the production of deeds, books and
writings in his possession or control. But it does not follow, because the
courts of law now have power to extend such relief, that a court of equity
should forego the exercise of an ancient and well-settled jurisdiction.
For without some positive act, the just inference is that the legislative
pleasure is that the jurisdiction shall remain upon its old foundations.
Accordingly, it has been frequently held that a court of equity should not
refuse to entertain a bill for discovery; although, by the enlargement of the
jurisdiction and remedies exercised by courts of law, similar relief could
be obtained by the complainant in his action at law. (Emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the dicta in Chapman v. Lee to the effect that bills
of discovery were obsolete in Ohio, other language in the court's opinion
has been seized upon and applied with a more liberal result in many
subsequent cases:
The doctrine and rules concerning the subject matter of discovery
established by courts of equity are believed to be still in force and to con-
trol the same matters in the new procedure."
Applying this rule seventeen years later, the Court of Common Pleas of
Franklin County indicated that "the pertinency of the interrogatories now
in question must be determined largely by the equitable rules of practice
under the old action of discovery."12  Subsequently, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Ashtabula County said: "It therefore becomes important to
determine what the rules of practice were, in the use of bills of discovery,
and the rights of parties relating thereto."' 3  And in 1938, the Court of
Appeals of Stark County incorporated in the syllabus of a case which
1023 Fed. 82, 83-84 (1885). See also Cannon v. McNab, 48 Ala. 99 (1872);
Millsaps v. Pfeiffer, 44 Miss. 805 (1870); Shotwell v. Smith, 20 N.J. Eq. 79
(1869).
"Graham v. Ohio Telephone & Telegraph Co., 2 Ohio NP. (n.s.) 612, 613, 15
Ohio Dec. 200, 202 (1904).
2bid.
' Russell v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry., 6 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 353, 356, 17
Ohio Dec. 435, 438 (1907).
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was specifically a petition for discovery, and nothing more, the following
rule: 'While the right of discovery in equity is superseded by the code
provision, the doctrine and rules established by courts of equity are in
force and are controlling."' 4 As late as 1953, however, a judge of the
Common Pleas Court of Franklin County emphasized the statement in
Chapman v. Lee that the bill of discovery is obsolete in Ohio, and stated
somewhat irascibly, "Yet counsel for the plaintiffs draws such a separate
action out of the mothballs and attempts to use it without any showing
as to the necessity thereof."' 5
OHIO CODE PROVISIONS
At this point, it is desirable to ascertain the specific remedies in the
field of discovery provided by the Ohio statutes. In 1853, the Fiftieth
General Assembly of the State of Ohio enacted the first Ohio Code of
Civil Procedure. This was truly a monumental task comprising 165
pages of the volume of Ohio Laws devoted to the work of that General
Assembly - a task so well planned and so well executed that a substantial
portion of it remains unchanged to this day. It included, however, only
two sections in any way relating to discovery procedure. Those were
sections 360 and 361 of the original Code of Civil Procedure, and they
will be found embodied almost verbatim in the present Revised Code
as sections 2317.33 and 2317.35. Only four years later, in 1857, the
legislature added those provisions which are now substantially embodied
in sections 2317.32, 2317.34 and 2317 48. Such changes as have been
made since these statutes were originally enacted one hundred years ago
are only minor and grammatical in nature, and there have been no sub-
stantive alterations in the interim.
The Ohio statute which at least parallels, if it does not embody en-
tirely, the equitable bill of discovery is Revised Code section 2317.48.
Except foi one phrase, the language is clear and simple and neither re-
quires nor lends itself to interpretation:
When a person claiming to have a cause of action or a defense to an
action commenced against him, without a discovery of the fact from the
adverse party, is unable to file his petition or answer, he may bring an
action for discovery; setting forth in his petition the necessity therefor and
the ground thereof, with such interrogatories relating to the subject matter
of the discovery as are necessary to procure the discovery sought. If such
petition is not demurred to, it must be fully and directly answered under
oath by the defendant. Upon the final disposition of the action, the costs
thereof shall be taxed in such manner as the court deems equitable.
Several points are worthy of emphasis. First, a separate statutory
"Driver v. F. W Woolworth Co., 58 Ohio App. 299, 16 N.E.2d 548 (1938)
iPlacke v. Washburn, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 565, 568, 126 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1953).
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action for discovery may be brought either by one who claims to have a
cause of action or by one who- is a defendant in an action already filed
and pending; second, whatever discovery is sought must be accomplished
by means of interrogatories attached to the discovery petition and in no
other fashion; third, the information sought to be obtained in an action
for discovery must be secured either from one's adversary, as by a de-
fendant in a pending action, or from one's anticipated adversary, if sought
by a prospective plaintiff; fourth, the one ambiguous or debatable phrase
in the statute is to be found in the words "if such petition is not de-
murred to."
No cases dealing with this latter language are to be found among
the Ohio decisions. In the absence of additional stated statutory grounds
for demurrer, it should be assumed that a demurrer to a petition for dis-
covery must be based on one or more of the statutory grounds for de-
murrers to any other type of action. It will be found hereafter that a
similar provision for "demurrer" is included in the statutes relating to
interrogatories which may be attached to any pleading in an action.
Again, no statutory ground for demurrer to such interrogatories is set
forth; and it will be found in practice that what most counsel employ as
a ground for demurrer to an interrogatory would normally be embodied
in a motion to strike from a pleading on the ground of lack of relevancy
or of pertinency. It has been argued by some counsel that a similar basis
should be allowed for demurrer in the statutory action for discovery, but
it should be noted that we are here dealing with a pleading - namely, a
petition. Since definite statutory grounds for demurrer have been stated
generally in the code and no others added, there is seemingly no basis
for treating a demurrer to a petition for discovery in the same manner
as a demurrer to interrogatories. It does not follow, of course, that there
may not also be, in addition to the demurrer to the petition itself, as
provided by Revised Code 2317A8, a demurrer to all or a portion of the
attached interrogatories, as provided by Revised Code section 2309A3.
The lawyers of Ohio give little evidence of resorting to the remedy
thus afforded, whether it be regarded as legal or equitable; and few cases
dealing with it are to be found among the reported decisions in Ohio.
Perhaps the best reason for this is to be found in the frequently insupera-
ble barriers to obtaining any information whatsoever, stemmihg from the
long line of authorities dealing with privileged communications.
STATUTORY DEFCIENCY - INFORMATION
IN HANDs OF THiRD PARTY
It is appropriate to state at this point that there is a prime defect in
the entire system of discovery practice and procedure, a gap in the entire
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plan for making all pertinent information available and a deficiency
which, in some instances, may have disastrous consequences. It has here-
tofore been emphasized that one of the essential requirements of a bill of
discovery in equity, or a petition for discovery under the provisions of the
Ohio Code, is that the action must be brought against ones declared or
prospective adversary. Not infrequently, however, occasions arise in
which a vital piece of information, which must be known before a law-
suit can be instituted, is within the knowledge of some third party
against whom there is no cause of action whatsoever. Should this third
party be persistently tight-lipped or very simply inclined to favor the
person against whom the information within his knowledge might be used,
the unfortunate fact is that neither law nor equity affords any genuine
remedy. On occasion, too, the courts themselves appear to lose sight of
this fact. An example of such a situation arose in the case of Stanley v.
Marown,16 decided in 1909 by the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton
County.
The plaintiff sued under a contract to recover from the defendant a
stipulated fee of $40.00 per week for a period of seventeen weeks for
exhibiting the plaintiff's model submarine boat and appliances at a park.
In his petition the plaintiff alleged that the defendant "was acting nor
only on his own behalf but as the agent and manager of another whose
identity was not disclosed to the plaintiff but whose names plaintiff asks
leave to add hereto as defendants when ascertained."'17
The plaintiff annexed to his petition interrogatories the purpose of
which was to learn the names of all of the persons or firms for whom
the defendant was acting in entering into the contract. A demurrer to
these interrogatories was sustained. The court pointed out that the
answers sought to be elicited would not disclose any facts "pertinent to
the issue." It appeared from the face of the contract that the defendant
was acting in the capacity of an agent but the prinGipal was undisclosed
and, accordingly, the defendant could be held personally liable. Of course,
the principal could also be 'held liable, when discovered, but the court
pointed out the Ohio rule that the principal and agent could not be sued
in the same action, and added:
If, therefore, the information sought by the interrogatories were in the
possession of the plaintiff, it would not avail hun because he could not
join the unknown parties, who would be the principal of the defendant
Martin, with Martin as defendant, as this would be joining the principal
and the agent in an action on a contract. If the information sought to be
brought out by the interrogatories cannot be used to bring in the unknown
parties, then the interrogatories are not pertinent to the issue. The avowed
"19 Ohio Dec. 864, 6 Ohio L Rep. 628 (1909).
I71d. at 865, 6 Ohio L. Rep. at 628.
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purpose of learning the names of these parties is to make them codefendants
of Martin, and this cannot be done because this controversy can be
determined without bringing in the unknown parties.'
The court then disclosed an erroneous conception of the possible
remedy available to the plaintiff by adding:
If the plaintiff desires to hold these unknown parties on this contract
he must first ascertain who they are and whether or not they authorized
Martin to execute this contract for them, after which he may be able to
bring this action on the contract against them. If the information cannot
be learned in any other way, he may bring an action under Revised Code
2317A8 for a discovery, and after the information is obtained he may
bring his suit at law on the contract against the discovered parties.'
Reading between the lines of such a case, it is perfectly apparent that
the plaintiff was not attempting to procure a judgment against the agent
Martin, who may well have been judgment proof, but rather to find out
the name of the undisclosed principal or principals against whom a
judgment might well have been collectable. Faced with this very practical
problem the plaintiff found himself entirely baffled by the serious gap
-in discovery practice and procedure which makes it impossible to secure
such information from a third person.20
The writer was personally involved in a situation of the type we have
been discussing, and succeeded in securing the required information by
simply adhering to the old adage that there must be more than one way
to skin a cat. A young man employed as an inspector in a large manu-
facturing plant was seriously injured while engaged in checking the work
-arned out by a large press, when a portion of the top of the press sud-
denly broke and a piece weighing approximately ninety pounds fell from
a height of ten feet and struck him in the head, rendering him instantly
unconscious and resulting in serious skull and brain damage. It appeared
that the injured party should, or might, have a valuable claim for damages
against the company which manufactured or installed the press. The in-
jured man's employer, however, remained adamant and refused to dis-
close any information whatsoever concerning the make of the press, the
date of its purchase and installation or the name of its manufacturer. In
this situation it appeared that the unfortunate injured party might well
go without redress other than the small amount of workman's compensa-
tion available under Ohio law. It was determined that it was necessary to
compel the furnishing of the required information by the only party
known to have it available.
'Id. at 866, 6 Ohio L. Rep. at 628, 629.
'Id. at 867, 6 Ohio L. Rep. at 629.
" Compare: In re Tichy, 161 Ohio St. 204, 118 N.E.2d 128 (1954).
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Accordingly, an action for discovery was instituted against the em-
ployer and attached to the petition were interrogatories, the answers to
which would elicit all of the required information. It is well established
law in this state that interrogatories attached to a petition must be an-
swered whether or not the petition is demurrable, and whether or not the
court has ruled upon a demurrer. The reason for this rule is obvious,
when one considers the fact that there are many cases in which demurrers
are erroneously sustained by rulings subsequently reversed. In the mean-
time sources of information, or information itself, attempted to ,be pro-
cured by interrogatories attached to a petition may be dissipated, lost or
destroyed. The law makes no distinction in this regard between a peti-
tion which is claimed by a defendant to be demurrable and a petition
which the plaintiff himself may realize is in fact demurrable. In any
event the procedure instituted on behalf of the injured party in this case
was successful and, notwithstanding the interposition of a demurrer to
the petition, the defendant was required to respond to the interrogatories.
As pointed out with some chagrin by defendant's counsel in the case, the
furnishing of the answers to the interrogatories made any further action
in the case by either party wholly unnecessary, and a ruling on the de-
murrer superfluous. Notwithstanding the success of this maneuver in
the instance cited, it would, however, be better if the law would recog-
nize the urgent need for a remedy in a situation of this kind and, either
by statute or by judicial fiat in equity, afford appropriate relief.2 '
DIscOVERY AND INSPECTION OF OBJECTS
We have thus far dealt with the procedures provided preliminary to
the filing of a lawsuit or the furnishing of an answer in a pending case
where, as the party himself must allege, it is impossible either to file
the suit or to prepare and file the answer without first securing the
information sought to be obtained.
Probably the most extensive use of discovery practice and procedure,
however, is in those processes which are employed by the parties to
secure information duting the course of pending litigation.
A fairly recent and completely practical use of this remedy of dis-
covery is to be found in the case of Driver v. The F W Woolworth Com-
pany.22 In that case the action for discovery was instituted by the de-
fendant, the F. W Woolworth Company, which had been sued for dam-
' See Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposstmor Discovery Procedure, 38
COLUM. L. Rv. 1179, 1191 (1938) "When a litigant finds it necessary to dis-
cover facts he should not be barred merely by the accident that a person having the
information is not a party to the suit."
'58 Ohio App. 299, 16 N.E.2d 548 (1938)
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ages allegedly resulting from the use of a certain mascara sold by it to
the plaintiff in the original action, and alleged to have resulted in in-
curable damage and infection to her eyes and skin. The petition of the
Woolworth Company alleged that it was unable to file its answer in the
damage suit,
for the reason that the plaintiff is withholding from the defendant
evidence which is necessary for the defendant to have before an answer can
be filed. The plaintiff has in her possession a portion of a tube of
mascara which she alleges she purchased at one of the defendants stores in
the City of Canton. She alleges that this mascara contains poisonous
harmful and injurious ingredients. Defendant has demanded that she pro-
duce said tube of mascara so that the same may be analyzed by a reputable
chemist for the purpose of determimng what if any poisonous, harmful and
injurious ingredients are in said tube Plaintiff has been advised by her
counsel not to permit said tube of mascara to be analyzed and this is being
done for the purpose of hindering and preventing the defendant from filing
its answer to the petition. Wherefore this defendant prays the court
for an order requiring said plaintiff to produce said tube of mascara in court
or deliver same to the defendant or have said tube of mascara analyzed by a
reputable chemist and furnish the defendant with a copy of said analysis.'
The trial court sustained a demurrer to this petition for discovery, but
the appellate court reversed and ruled that the petition stated a good cause
of action. The appellate court made two interesting points. First it held
that the mere sustaining of a demurrer to a petition for discovery con-
stituted a reviewable order, contrary to the general rule which requires
the disnssal of a petition before the sustaining of a demurrer can be re-
viewed by an appellate court. In the next place the court ruled that the
defendant was entitled to the information which it sought before it could
be required to file its answer. It is true that this ruling by the appellate
court dealt with a question which was then moot since, upon the sustain-
ing of the demurrer, the plaintiff, as defendant in the damage suit, elected
to file its answer in that action. Nevertheless, the court discussed the
question thoroughly and arrived at what appears to be a completely logi-
cal conclusion. It is a much more general practice today, and has been for
many years, for defendants who find themselves in a comparable situa-
tion to avail themselves of other equally practical and much more readily
obtainable remedies. Common instances include the filing of a motion
in the damage suit demanding the right of inspection or the right to ex-
amine and to test a particular product or piece of equipment in the pos-
session of the plaintiff, the special properties or infirmities -of which con-
stitute the basis for plaintiff's claims.
In the Woolworth case counsel for the defendant, the injured party,
argued that the tube of mascara was their client's property, that the client
I Id. at 300, 301, 16 N.E.2d at 549.
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had no funds with which to procure and provide a chemical analysis and
that it would be unfair to require the client to be faced with the testi-
mony of plaintiff's specialists. The court rejected this argument and held
that "the real issue in this case was whether this article, purchased and
used, caused the injury which the plaintiff sustained. That is a question
of fact, and the litigants were entitled to have all competent evidence
bearing upon that issue."24  In its opinion, the court cited and relied
strongly upon a decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in the
case of Reynolds v. Burgess Sulphae Fiber Co.,25 regarding it as the lead-
ing case on discovery dealing with the propositions which have been
raised in opposition to the right of discovery. The Ohio court was in-
deed astute in its evaluation of the Reynolds case, and this review would
fall far short of its mark if a detailed discussion of this decision were
omitted.
The New Hampshire case goes one step further than any reported
decision in Ohio. There the action for discovery was brought by a plain-
tiff, an administratrix, who had already filed an action at law for dam-
ages, which was pending at the time the action for discovery was insti-
tuted. In the wrongful death action it was alleged that the defendant had
negligently caused the death of the decedent by furnishing him improper,
unsuitable and dangerous machinery for use in his employment. In the
action for discovery, the plaintiff sought to inspect the pieces of a broken
strap on the connecting rod of an engine, which allegedly caused the
decedents fatal fall. The broken strap was in the defendant's possession,
and plaintiff's counsel sought to examine it to prepare their case properly
for trial.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition for discovery. This
ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in a
lengthy opinion in which that court declared:
The infringement of property rights in such cases is justified upon the
grounds that it is necessary to the Admsnstratton of lustce As has
been seen, the remedy for discovery in aid of actions at law was introduced
for the very purpose of securing proper trials therein. To warrant dis-
covery, it is not necessary that there should be absolutely no means of prov-
ing plaintiff's case without it. A party may maintain a bill for discovery
either because he has no proof or wants. it in aid of other proof.
It is evident that expert testimony may be competent upon the issue
to be tried, whether it relate to the form of the strap, the manner of its
constructioi or the character of the materials from which it was made.
The defendants have ample opportunity to procure such testimony. Justce
requtres that the plaintiff shall also have an opportunity to have the strap
examined by persons in whose skill and scientific knowledge she has
UId. at 304, 16 N.E.2d at 550.
71 N.H. 332, 51 Ad. 1075 (1902)
[March
DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN OHIO
confidence. There cannot be a fair trial of a case unless such opportunity
is given to the plaintiff. (Emphasis added) .'
Again the reader is warned that the modern practice is somewhat dif-
ferent than that which was required in the New Hampshire case, but it
is extremely important to emphasize that it is only the procedure which
is different The rights of the parties to a discovery of information in
the custody or under the control of an opposing party are today precisely
those which were set forth in the opinion of the New Hampshire court
And what is even more important, the basis for the right of discovery in
modem practice is precisely that which was set forth in the Reynolds de-
cision. Under modern practice, however, if the theory of the plaintiff's
case or of the defense can be evolved without the necessity of an advance
inspection of equipment or of a product around which the action revolves,
then the customary procedure at present is to procure such an inspection
upon the filing of a motion for that purpose.
An example of the modern practice will be found in the case of Placke
v. Washburn2 7 That case involved a separate and independent action
for discovery' at the time when there was pending between the same
parties an action for damages for breach of contract. The court sustained
a demurrer to the action for discovery, declaring that the plaintiff in that
action could have obtained the same information by the use of interroga-
tories or depositions in the original action. The point of importance, of
course, is not the mechanics by which the information could have been




Leaving aside for the moment the special remedies provided by Ohio
statutes for the production and inspection of books, documents and rec-
ords, or the furnishing of copies of the same, information is secured by
parties to pending litigation in one of two ways, either by written inter-
rogatories or by oral depositions.
It is obvious that an oral deposition affords a much more flexible
process for securing desired information. Among the many reasons for
this is the fact that the person questioned cannot know in advance the
specific question he will be called upon to answer, and cannot have the
time or opportunity to prepare a studied reply. On responding to writ-
ten interrogatories he has ample time to study and to prepare Ins answers
"Id. at 335, 339, 51 Ad. at 1077, 1078.
'69 Ohio LAbs. 565, 126 N.E.2d 610 (1953).
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carefully and, in a large number of instances, to phrase his responses so
as to make them self-serving. Moreover, counsel in the course of oral
depositions may phrase questions according to the answers already re-
ceived and, frequently, by adroit examination and cross-examination, se-
cure additional information of utmost value.
The phase of this procedure with which we are here most concerned
is the scope and the extent of the examination which may be conducted
and of the questions which may be propounded, whether written or oral.
Generally speaking, the rules and limitations surrounding written inter-
rogatories are somewhat more restrictive than those relating to deposi-
tions. The statutes of Ohio which are involved at this point include
Revised Code sections 2309.43, 2309.44 and 2309.45"
A party may annex to his pleading, other than a demurrer, interroga-
tories pertinent to the issues made in the pleadings, which interrogatories,
if not demurred to, shall be plainly and fully answered under oath by the
party to whom they are propounded, or if such party is a corporation, by
the president, secretary or other officer thereof as the party propounding
requires.
When annexed to a petition, the interrogatories provided for' by section
2309.43 of the Revised Code shall be answered within the time limited for
answer to the petition; when annexed to the answer, within the time limited
for a reply; and when annexed to the reply, within the time allowed for
an answer. Further time may be allowed in all cases by the court, or a judge
thereof in vacation.'
Answers to interrogatories may be enforced by an order of dismissal,
judgment by default, or by attachment, as the justice of the case requires.
On the trial, such answers, so far as they contain competent testimony on
the issues made, may be used by either party.'
The provisions of the code above quoted will be found m the chapter
dealing with pleadings. A further provision, however, will be found in
the chapter of the code dealing with evidence:
At the instance of the adverse party, a party may be examined as if
under cross-examination, orally, or by way of deposition, like any other
witness, by way of written interrogatories filed in the action or proceeding
pertinent to previous pleadings of such party, or by any one or more of such
methods.
Unless demurred to or otherwise ordered by the court, each of such
written interrogatories shall be plainly and fully answered in writing under
oath within thirty days. No party may, without leave of court, file more
than one set of interrogatories to be answered by the same witness.
If the party is a corporation, any or all of the officers thereof may be so
examined at the instance of the adverse party. The party calling for such
examination shall not thereby be concluded but may rebut it by evidence.'
2'OHIo Ra. CODE § 2309.43.
= OHIO REV. CODE 5 2309.44.
8OHIo REV. CoDE § 2309.45.
O-o REv. CODE §5 2317.07.
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Judictal Limitattons
It is at this point that we run into the ancient conception dividing
evidence in a lawsuit, whether written or oral, according to the claims of
the respective litigants, and holding in effect that one is only entitled
to secure evidence which will shed light upon his own dains. Although
this doctrine has been repeatedly shown to be wholly fallacious and il-
logical, some courts still adhere to it directly and vestiges of it will be
found attached to many fairly current decisions. As long ago as 1892
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, in-
terpreting the Ohio statute dealing with interrogatories, declared:
Notwithstanding plaintiff's statutory right to examine defendant as a
witness upon all matters in issue, the court will require defendant to answer
interrogatories within proper limits, because evidence thus put in the
pleadings is of more advantage to the plaintiff than when contained in
depositions."
The lawyers of today will find quite remarkable the decision of the
Court of Common Pleas of Ashtabula County in the case of Russell v.
Lakeshore & Michigan Southern Railway,as which contains one of the
most thorough discussions of the nature and extent of discovery and in-
terrogatories that will be found in any case reported to this date. The
fact that the decision will now appear so strange is a fine example of
how, within a span of only two or three decades, courts may completely
reverse their point of view on a subject of prime importance to the bar
and to all litigants. In that case the defendant's train struck and killed
the plaintiff's decedent, who was driving a horse and buggy. The de-
fendant attached to its answer a number of interrogatories inquiring,
among other things, concermng the following:
1. What acts of care did the plaintiff decedent exercise in approach-
ing the crossing?
2. Did the horse driven by decedent approach the crossing on a
walk, trot, or run?
3. Did the decedent look and listen for approaching trains?
4. Did the decedent have full control of her horse at and just previous
to driving upon the crossing?"
After reviewing the history of discovery procedure, the Ohio statute
and statements from various text writers, the court said:
It is further a well established rule that interrogatories cannot properly
be asked except concerning matters pertinent to the pleading to which they
are attached. The fundamental rule on this subject is that the plaintiff's
right to a discovery does not extend to all facts which may be material to
'Slater v. Banwell, 50 Fed. 150 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1892) (syllabus #2)
" 6 Ohio N.P.(ns.) 353, 17 Ohio Dec. 435 (1907).
" Id. at 354, 17 Ohio Dec. at 436.
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the issue, but is confined to those which may be material to his own title
or cause of action. It does not enable him to pry into defendant's case or
find out the evidence upon which that case will be supported.
It may be easily perceived that answers to the inquiries propounded in
this case would be very convenient to the defendant, and perhaps beneficial
to its interests in learning; in advance of the trial, the position and evidence
of the adverse party upon various propositions, yet that desire cannot
properly be granted. 25
The court accordingly granted the motion of the plaintiff to strike all of
the interrogatories.
Before the reader arrives at the conclusion that these principles are
almost ancient history and the decision of the court almost laughable in
the light of established modern practice, it should be recognized that
these rigid rules relied upon by the court die hard and adherence to them
will be found on the bench today.
Twenty-five years after the decision in the Russell case, the court of
Common Pleas of Huron County decided the case of Ward v'. Mutual
Truckzng Company."6  It is unnecessary to do more than examine the
syllabus of the Ward case to learn how strongly the court adhered to the
old rules, which at that late date appeared to have been almost forgotten:
Interrogatories annexed to a pleading by virtue of Revised Code sec-
tion 2309A3 may be used to aid a party in supporting his own cause but
not to help him to destroy the cause of his opponent.
Interrogatories propounded to the plaintiff by the defendant which
seek disclosure of evidence to be used by the plaintiff in establishing his
damages are improper.'
In that case the court again reviewed at great length the history of
discovery practice and procedure, citing Chapman v. Lee, Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence and the ancient Connecticut decision m the case of
Downe v. Nettleton,38 cited in 1907 by the Ashtabula trial court. The
court even went back to a decision of the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts in 1854 in which that court, after expounding at great length on the
subject of discovery, confirmed the old rule that it does not extend to a
discovery of the manner in which the opponent's case is to be established.39
The decision in the Ward case was rendered by a trial judge who later
found himself presented with the same problem as a member of the ap-
pellate bench. Notwithstanding many recent decisions among the re-
ported Ohio cases indicating the adoption of an entirely different point
of view and pointing out the fallaciousness of the reasoning of the older
MId. at 359, 360, 17 Ohio Dec. at 440, 441.
1 Ohio Op. 456,22 Ohio L. Abs. 636 (1933).
"Ibid. (syllabus).
m61 Conn. 593, 24 Ad. 977 (1892).
68 Mass. 558 (1854).
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authorities, this judge still adhered to the old rule in a decision rendered
m 1938, and successfully persuaded both of his associates on the bench
to concur. The syllabus of that case contains the following pronounce-
ment:
The primary purpose of interrogatories appended to a pleading and
required to be answered by an opposing party is to enable the interrogating
party to properly plead his cause or defense.'
The judge added in his opinion:
The opinion of the writer in regard to these statutes in their relation to
pleading is expressed in Ward v. Mutual Trucking Company. From that
opinion it is manifest that in my judgment the demurrer to these two in-
terrogatories should also have been sustained, but that was not done. The
use of answers to interrogatories as evidence seems to be but incidental to
the prime purpose - pleading."
These cases are cited as a prime example of our warning that the old
rules die hard and will continue to find supporters upon the bench even
today. It is perfectly clear that there is nothing whatsoever m the lan-
guage of Revised Code section 2309A3 to indicate the purpose which the
court attributed to it in the cases just discussed. The real purpose of the
statute, which is to enable a party to secure information for whatever
value it may be to him in preparing a pleading, in preparing for trial,
or as a basis for securing further information, appears not even to have
been considered by the court in.these cases.
The intransigent judge to whom we have referred will be found still
pursuing the same rigid views as late as 1950 notwithstanding the fact
that, by that date, a very different and far more liberal point of view was
evidenced by the decisions of other courts throughout the state. In both
the syllabus and in the opinion written by him in the case of Sterling v.
Hanley Motor Sales, Inc.,42 decided by the Court of Appeals of Lucas
County, will be found the statement: "The purpose of annexing inter-
rogatories to a pleading is for discovery to enable a pleader to prepare
and plead his own case and is not to help him destroy the case of his
adversary."
Perhaps the lawyers of the state were partly to blame for the length
of time it took to sweep out some of the cobwebs which enmeshed this
valuable procedural tool. In 1909 the Common Pleas judge of Wayne
County took occasion to observe:
The propounding of interrogatories in a pleading has not been much
resorted to under our modern practice, consequently authorities in this
dSchuldt v. Associates Investment Co., 61 Ohio App. 213, 22 N.E.2d 572 (1938)
(syllabus #1).
"Id. at 215, 22 N.E.2d at 573.
"87 Ohio App. 362, 368, 95 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1950)
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state are not numerous, but we think they are sufficiently so to furnish all
the law on this subject necessary.'3
The court in that case was called upon to consider a demurrer to n-
terrogatories which were attached to what, according to the trial judge,
"the defendant pleases to call his answer." Apparently the existing light
on the subject, which the court found to be all that was necessary, was
still quite dim, although the judge was probably in agreement with what
were then the best minds of his time when he declared that:
a proceeding under this statute was not a mere fishing expedition,
but was intended as a means of discovery, not of his opponent's cause of
action or ground of defense, but of his own cause of action or ground of
defense."
The court ruled that since the answer of the defendant apparently
raised no "issues," it was not proper to attach any interrogatories to that
answer, adding:
This being the true principle upon which the right of discovery de-
pends, how can this court say that any interrogatory is necessary, pertinent
or useful to this defendant when the court is not notified as to what the de-
fense is to be?' 5
However, the glimmer of a brighter lig1ht was occasionally to be seen
even in those relatively early days. The Court of Common Pleas of Frank-
lin County was required to rule upon interrogatories attached to a peti-
tion in 1904, and made the following sensible comments:
The pertinency of the interrogatories now in question must be deter-
mined largely by the equitable rules of practice under the old action of
discovery.
It is manifest that all interrogatories having for their object a discovery
may loosely be called "fishing," and it is therefore no objection to an inter-
rogatory that they require from the defendant information which may be
detrimental to the defendant. The real requirement is that the interroga-
tory itself be pertinent. In other words, where the information sought
by the interrogatory will be material or relevant to the relief sought by
the petition a demurrer to the same should be over-ruled. Whatever
abuse may have grown up under the common law practice with reference
to pleadings, it certainly now is well settled that under the code the law does
not favor nor encourage technical pitfalls or legal ambuscades."
The language employed by that court in 1904 indicated that the judge
was several decades ahead of his day. The same reasoning still may be
effectively used a half century later. The chief difference will be in the
'Dye v. Buchwalter, 8 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 630, 632, 19 Ohio Dec. 791, 793 (1909).
"Id. at 632, 19 Ohio Dec. at 793.
Ibd.
'Graham v. Ohio Telephone & Telegraph Co., 2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 612, 614, 15
Ohio Dec. 200, 202 (1904).
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interpretation of the word "pertinent," since the modern usage will apply
this word to interrogatories which relate to either "side" of a lawsuit, no
matter which litigant propounds them. That this word is the key to the
entire problem in any case involving the application of Revised Code sec-
tion 2309.43 was recognized in many cases, as by the Superior Court of
Cincinnati in 1905.11
Referring to the identical predecessor of the section now in effect,
the court said: "The only requirement interposed by this section it will
be observed is that the interrogatories be pertinent to the issue."48 The
court then added the following interesting and significant statement,
which might well be kept in mind on many occasions in modern practice:
The action being one at law for the recovery of money, under our code,
plaintiff is entitled to all the relief to which she would have been entitled
under the old bill of discovery."
Again, notwithstanding the views appearing in many cases to the
effect that the purpose of the statute was to aid the interrogator in his
pleadings, we find the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County de-
daring as long ago as 1907
The object of filing interrogatories under our code pleadings is the
same as that of a bill of discovery under the old practice, which was for
the purpose of permitting the interrogator to compel the opposite party to
furnish him information that, if pertinent to the issues in the pleadings,
might be used as evidence in the trial of the case. for as a rule the
interrogatories are framed to secure evidence and not the material facts upon
which the pleading is founded. (Emphasis added) *W
It appears that at least one judge a half century ago recognized the pur-
pose and the use of this procedural device, the value of which is, even
today, just beginning to become apparent to the bar.
Progress Under Modern Cases
Just how valuable the device can be will be found by an examination
of a number of recent decisions. Each of these decisions, which sharpens
the trial lawyer's working tools, and performs thereby an important ser-
vice, will be considered here in chronological order.
In 1950 the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County considered
carefully a demurrer to thirty-one interrogatories attached to the plain-
tiff's petition.51 In this case the court wavers between what the court
" Kleimeyer v. Payne, 16 Ohio Dec. 289, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 386 (1905).
Is ibid.
" Id. at 290, 3 Ohio L. Rep. at 387.
'oWild v. Cadwalder, 18 Ohio Dec. 565, 566, 5 Ohio L. Rep. 477 (1907).
" Leeper v. Nimer, 58 Ohio L. Abs. 500, 94 N.E.2d 286 (1950).
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declares to be the established rules and what the court recognizes ought
to be the current policy of the law. The difficulty which the judge en-
counters is noted at the outset of his opinion:
This subject has always been rather confusing to the courts generally
and to this court in particular.
In the court's opinion the words "pertinent to the issue made in the
pleadings," [Revised Code 2309.43J do not restrict the scope of the inter-
rogatories to such as will enable plaintiff to properly plead his case on
paper before trial.
This method was provided to take the place of the old bill of discovery
procedure which was cumbersome and expensive. However, even there the
purpose was to enable a party to obtain such facts as might tend to prove
his case, and not for the sole purpose of enabling him to plead his case
properly on paper. (Emphasis added) .
At this point the court wavered and was certainly not correct in stating
that:
The authorities agree however that although the interrogatories may
be directed toward answers which will aid the party purring them in the
preparation of his case proper, they cannot be put so as to elicit from
the answering party the nature of his defense.
Nor should an adverse party be compelled to answer interrogatories
where the answers are within the knowledge of the interrogator.'
It is regretful that this statement also reflects a lack of comprehension
of the broad purpose and intent of the discovery statutes in general. It
is frequently not sufficient that the interrogator knows or thinks that he
knows the answer to a particular question. It may frequently be equally
important for the interrogator to learn what his opponent believes to be
the answer to that question, or whether his opponent will concede or
deny that the answer to the question is what the interrogator believes it
to be. In this manner through the device of a written interrogatory, as
well as through the device of an oral deposition, a party to a lawsuit may
be compelled to go on record in advance of the trial of the case, with
respect to any matter of fact or of personal opinion that is pertinent to
any of the issues raised by the pleadings.
The court then proceeds to indicate its recognition of the correct
modern approach to the subject by declaring:
In the final analysis the court has a great amount of discretionary
power in the matter. After all a lawsuit should not be looked upon as a
"Id. at 501, 94 N.E.2d at 287. The court also called attention to an article by
Byron E. Ford in the OHIO BAR (August 7, 1950) at 419" 'The test of an inter-
rogatory is whether it is pertinent to the issue.' Like many words, the word 'per-
tinent' can be used with some degree of elasticity by the courts. Generally speaking,
the phrase means that interrogatories must be directly connected with the subject
matter of the action or defense."
" Id. at 502, 94 N.E.2d at 287, 288.
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game or battle of wits. We should try to get at the ultimate facts, or at
least those facts which are not in dispute, as is the theory in a pre-trial
procedure. If we apply a reasonable and liberal interpretation, either side
can use this method to advantage. (Emphasis added).
Like the White Knight in 'Through the Looking Glass,' the judge
appears to be constantly getting on and falling off his charger. In the
next sentence of the court's opinion, it is difficult to determine whether
the judge is on or off his horse at the moment when he states:
In this court's opinion we should adopt a liberal policy but should not
extend it to such an extent as to allow this procedure to take the place of
calling the defendant for cross-examinaton on deposition.4
At any rate it is easy to imagine, after an examination of the fore-
going comments by the judge, why the court found this subject confusing.
It is only fair to add that opinions of the courts in many cases dealing
with the subject indicate a somewhat similar, though certainly not as
candidly an admitted state of confusion. There is no longer any justifica-
tion for confused thinking on the subject, and it is high time that the courts
cut loose entirely from any reliance upon the once prevalent doctrine
that prevented a litigant from "prying into" the "case" of his opponent.
After all, it is no invasion of his right of privacy. If a plaintiff has a
valid cause of action and is entitled to prevail on the triaf of a lawsuit,
it is vital to his case not only to present the evidence in support of his
petition, but to be prepared to meet the claims and defenses of his oppo-
nent. To be properly prepared, he should be Informed concerning those
claims and defenses in detail in advance of the trial. While it is sin-
practscal as a matter of practice and procedure to permit written inter-
rogatories completely to take the place of oral deposmons, there is no
reason whatsoever to deny to either party the right to make use of writ-
ten interrogatories, either to take the place of oral depositions in a sub-
stantial measure or to supplement such depositions to an Important de-
gree. Certainly there is nothing in the language of the statutes relating to
depositions that invests them with a broader purpose or a more liberal
scope than should be accorded the statutes regarding written interroga-
tories.
In 1951 the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County discussed
this question at some length, and considered the right of the defendant
to obtain the names and addresses of wtnesses. After discussing the old
equity rules and practice, citing Wigmore's statement that "the opponent
cannot be asked to disclose the names of the witnesses to his own case,"56
the court concluded:
54Id. at 502, 94 N.E.2d at 288.
Ibid.
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1856 (3rd ed. 1940).
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It would seem that the courts have moved away from the old theory
that a lawsuit is a game of wits and that secrecy must surround a party s
case until the day of,trial. In the federal courts the federal rules of civil
procedure have recognized the need of getting at the truth of controversies
at an early stage with a view to clearing the issues and eliminating surprises.
It is logical that the state courts should arrive at the same result. After all
a lawsuit is a quest for truth; relevant matters testified to on deposition
will be as true today as at the time of triaL (Emphasis added) .5
In the same year the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County
went back to the old rule for which there was certainly no longer any
justification, and did so without any citation of authority, saying: "It
appears to the court that the interrogatories are not needed by the
plaintiff to properly plead their case, nor does it appear that they *are
pertinent, relevant or proper and for that reason the demurrers to the
same are sustained." s58
Also in 1951, the Common Pleas Court of Geauga County cleared
away much of the remaining undergrowth in the case of Sloan v. S. S.
Kresge Co.59 The action was a personal injury case. The defendant at-
tached to its answer the following interrogatories, among others:
1. What is the name and address of each doctor who attended the
plaintiff? How many times and on what dates did each of them so at-
tend her?
2. What is the name and address of each hospital at which plaintiff
was attended? During what period of time was she confined to such hos-
pital?
3. What is the name and address of each of the nurses, if any, by
whom the plaintiff was attended, and as to each nurse state whether she was
registered or practical and the dates each nurse attended the plaintiff?'
In overruling demurrers to each of the interrogatories, the court
stated:
No statutory reason explains why Ohio courts have permitted full
latitude in the use of discovery by deposition, but have denied the equivalent
latitude in the use of discovery by interrogatory. Thoughtful and experi-
enced lawyers have pointed out that "intexrogatories attached to pleadings
afford a simple and inexpensive way of getting information from an adverse
party" but point out that their scope has been limited.
This court agrees that the words of [Revised Code section 2309.43)
do not and cannot warrant the restrictions placed upon the use of inter-
rogatory power by these prior court decisions. Therefore those decisions
will not be followed. Accordingly it is concluded that a party may
propound any interrogatory which seeks from his opponent information
Furman v. Central Park Plaza Corp., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 172, 176, 102 N.E.2d 622,
625 (1951).
'Wasserman v. West India Coffee Co., 62 Ohio L. Abs. 190, 195, 97 N.E.2d 429,
432 (1951)
'59 Ohio L. Abs. 420, 97 N.E.2d 238 (1951).
'ld. at 421, 97 N.E.2d at 239.
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which is relevant to the issues of the action, and which information is not
privileged. (Emphasis added)."
Outside of the successful culmination of litigation in which he is
involved, few things are more pleasing and satisfying to a careful and
thorough trial lawyer than a judge who, by painstaking and careful
analysis and the application of fundamental reasoning, arrives at a logical
solution of some troublesome legal problem. The result is even more
satisfying when the correct solution of the problem requires the court to
disregard a "respectable' line of authorities which have arrived at quite
a different conclusion. This is particularly true when the result is
reached by a trial court after long and careful study and in disregard
of both trial and appellate decisions, which the court refuses to follow be-
cause they are lacking in sound reasoning and based upon a fallacious
foundation. The Sloan case is an outstanding and encouraging example.
This case was cited with approval and followed by the Court of
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County in the following year, 1952, in a case
in which the court.was called upon to consider interrogatories attached
to a plaintiff's petition.62 In a carefully reasoned opinion the court again
pointed out that the word "pertinent" contained the key to all of' the
problems raised by the demurrer. The court then referred to, and
quoted at some length from the Russell case, declaring:
This case was decided by the Common Pleas Court of Ashtabula County
forty-five years ago. Apparently however the question here at issue has
never been directly passed upon by the Supreme Court of Ohio. In the
case of Chapman v. Lee, decided in 1887, there is dicta to this effect: "The
doctrine and rules concerning the subject matter of discovery established
by courts of equity, are believed to be still in force and to control the same
matters in the new procedure (providing for interrogatories attached to
pleadings, depositions)."
With this as a starring point the court in the Russell case then pro-
ceeds to engraft the rules formerly applicable to bills of discovery upon the
asking of interrogatories under the new statute. This court is of the
opinion that the decision in the Russell case went far beyond the obvious
intent of the statute and applied to interrogatories tests neither contem-
plated nor authorized by the plain, simple language of the law itself. This
court sees no reason why at this late date a resort should be had to chancery
rules which apply to bills of discovery.
The conclusions reached in this case are in accord with the views
previously expressed by this writer in an analysis of the earlier cases on
this subject. The opinion in that case was rendered on September 30,
1952 and indicated, as did the opinion in the Sloan case, that the question
at issue had not been directly passed upon by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
" Id. at 427, 428, 97 N.B.2d at 243.
"Powers v. Ruelbach, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 30, 108 N.E.2d 876 (1952).
'Id. at 31, 32, 108 N.E.2d at 877, 878.
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A few months earlier, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio had made
direct reference to the statutes relating to interrogatories:
The provisions of [Revised Code 2309A3] authorizing a party to
annex to his pleadings interrogatories pertinent to the issue made in the
pleadings vest in the trial court authority to determine on demurrer to
such interrogatories the pertinence thereof and discretion in the enforce-
ment of answers thereto."
Undoubtedly one of the most thorough decisions on this subject was
rendered in 1953 by the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County in
the case of Dteckbrader v. New York Central R.R., 5 -in which the court
adopts the modern interpretation of the statute:
(The Statutory sections providing for interrogatories and depositions)
were mntended to obviate the necessity of filing the old chancery bill of
discovery and to permit either side in a lawsuit to become fully acquainted
with the facts pertinent to the issues in possession of other parties to the
sit prior to the trial of the case; and thus aid the litigants to more com-
pletely prepare their case and thereby accomplish the maximum presenta-
non of the issues at the trial and thus also accomplish substantial justice.
Before passing specifically upon the interrogatories before the court,
the judge quotes at some length from the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 6 and also quotes in full the federal
deposition and discovery rules 26, 33 and 34 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The case is one of considerable importance as an example of the
type and scope of information which can and should now be obtainable
by the use of interrogatories attached to pleadings. It involved a collision
between a tractor trailer and a train and the plaintiff was permitted by
the court to obtain the following information:
The name, address and job title of all crew members assigned to the
train.
The name and job title of each member of the crew actually on the train
at the time of the collision.
Where each member of the crew, by name and job title, was on the
train at the time of the collision or within one minute prior thereto.
What each member of the crew, by name and job title, was doing im-
mediately prior to the collision.
The date of all accidents which occurred during the year preceding the
date of the accident at the crossing where the accident occurred.
The names and addresses of all persons whose person or property was
injured within a period of one year prior to the date of the collision at
that crossing and the dates of the injuries to such person or property.
"Collins v. Yellow Cab Co., 157 Ohio St. 311, 105 N.E.2d 395 (1952) (syllabus
#1).
"64 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 592, 113 N.E.2d 268, 274 (1953).
"329 U.S. 495 (1947). This leading case is discussed in full at a later point in
this artide.
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Whether the accident was reported to the Public Service Commission
(in this case, of Indiana) and if such report was made, a complete copy of
the report.
Whether a report was made to the Interstate Commerce Commission
and, if so, a complete copy of that report.
With respect to the interrogatories concerning prior accidents at the
crossing within the previous year the court had this to say-
Evidence of prior similar accidents is admissible for two purposes and
two purposes only. One, for the purpose of showing the dangerous
character or condition thereof - whether or not a dangerous condition
existed; and, two, to show notice to the defendant of such character or
condition - to bring home to him notice of the danger or defect which is
claimed to have caused the accident.,
With respect to the interrogatories concerning the names and ad-
dresses of all persons who had suffered personal injury or property dam-
age at the crossing within the previous year, the court said:
The information contained therein may enable the plaintiff to discover
from such persons the character of the accidents in which they were in-
volved, so as to possibly prove the similarity of those accidents to the acci-
dent in the case at bar. It is quite true that the names and addresses of
the parties involved would not of themselves be admissible in evidence,
yet such information could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and
since interrogatories are used as a substitute for the old discovery proceed-
ings under the authories above stated it is proper to seek such information
through interrogatories.'
This case affords an outstanding example of the progress that has
been made since the decision in the Russell case and others of the similar
and earlier view which, unfortunately, is still adhered to by some of the
courts in this state. The court in the Dieckbrader case made a thorough
and careful analysis of the statutes and a reasoned appraisal of their pur-
pose. The result is one which ought to be widely followed and applied.
The complete disparity of viewpoints on this subject cannot better be
illustrated than by considering a decision rendered in 1954 by the Court
of Appeals of Trumbull County. 9 With utter disregard for the numerous
more recent decisions expounding the liberal point of view, the court,
after lip service to the proposition that interrogatories are to be liberally
construed, declares:
Since the information must both be "pertinent to the issues" and, of
course, admissible at the trial, and since the cardinal requirement of the
petition, of the answer, and of the reply demands the use of "ordinary and
concise language" there appears no reason why a court should not apply
"TDieckbrader v. New York Central R.R., 64 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 602, 113 N.E.2d
268,281 (1953).
1 Ibu.
' Eisaman v. Wiemer, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 199, 126 N.E.2d 92 (1954)
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simple brevity to the range of interrogatories. Demurrer to interroga-
tories was evidently suggested for that purpose therefore an additional re-
quirement should be added. There is no necessity for permitting cross-
examination through interrogatories.
Here we find a remarkable and obviously a thoroughly unjustified
example of interpretation of a statute which, as indicated in an earlier
decision rendered in the same county by another judge, was so dear and
unambiguous as to require no interpretation whatsoever. Certainly there
as nothing in any of the interrogatory statutes justifying a confinement
either of the interrogatories or of the answers to "ordinary and concise
language," which is a phrase to be found only in the statutes dealing with
the framing of pleadings. It appears therefore that this court has clearly
engaged in the proscribed practice of judicial legislation not only by re-
stricting the language of the interrogatories, but also by adding the fur-
ther interpretive rule which would bar the interrogator from engaging
in "cross-examination through interrogatories."
Since this is the latest reported decision dealing with the scope of
interrogatories in Ohio, it is apparent that the practicing attorney can
easily find authorities to support his position no matter on which side of
the controversy he may find himself.
Procedare to Enforce Answers
Having determined, so far as possible, the extent and scope of inter-
rogatories which may be propounded and information which may be
secured, the question arises: In what manner may the interrogator enforce
the privileges accorded him by the Ohio statutes? What procedure, what
weapons may he employ to make certain he receives the information to
which he is enti.ted? In part the answers to these questions are supplied
by the language of the Ohio statutes, and in part the answers still remain
to be furnished by cases as yet undecided.
In the light of a recent amendment of the Ohio statutes, the procedure
depends upon the manner in which the interrogatories are propounded.
If they are propounded by annexing them to a pleading, under the pro-
visions of Revised Code section 2309.43, then the furnishing of the
answers may be enforced under the provisions of section 2309.45. As-
suming that no demurrers have been filed to the interrogatories or that
such demurrers as may have been filed have been overruled, so that the
party to whom they have been propounded is now required to answer, it
is provided by section 2309.45 that: "Answers 'to interrogatories may be
enforced by an order of dismissal, judgment by default, or by attach-
ment, as the justice of the case requires."
"Id. at 201, 126 N.E.2d at 93, 94.
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The authority vested in the trial court 'by this statute is a summary
power. Within the experience and to the knowledge of the writer, the
full authority given the court by this statute has never been exercised. Gen-
erally speaking, the threat of its exercise by the court has been sufficient
to procure from a recalcitrant party some answer to each interrogatory
propounded. The real controversy occurs when an answer is farntshed
which, according to the party propounding the interrogatory, is not a
proper answer, while the opposing party takes quite a contrary position.
It is evident that, in attempting to resolve a controversy of this nature, a
trial court will'be very reluctant to exercise the full summary authority
conferred upon it by the statute. Thus the result may not infrequently
require one or more hearings before the court, frequently highly argu-
mentative, before some compromise solution is reached which may well
be unsatisfactory to both parties. However, no other means has been
provided for enforcing the furnishing of answers to interrogatories at-
tached to pleadings.
On the other hand, where the interrogatories are not attached to
pleadings, but are simply filed in the action with the clerk, and pro-
pounded under the provisions of Revised Code section 2317.07, no statu-
tory means or method of enforcing the answers to such -interrogatories has
'been provided. It should be noted that the propounding of interrogatories
under section 2317.07 is a privilege of very recent origin which was added
to this section of the code in 1953. Whatever means may eventually be
found to enforce the privilege granted by this section will have to be
created by the courts themselves.
It seems dear, from the absence of any statutory means of enforce-
ment, that the mere failure to answer interrogatories propounded under
this statutory section vests in the court no authority to take any action
whatsoever. This is particularly true since section 2317.07 is to be found
in that chapter of the Revised Code dealing with the subject of evidence
whereas the prior section, relating to interrogatories, which has been in
effect for many years; is to be found in an entirely different chapter of
the code dealing with pleadings. It is also dear that the court may not
assume the authority to exercise such a summary power as that required
for the dismissal of a lawsuit or the granting of a judgment by default,
unless that power is dearly and expressly granted to the court.
It is suggested that an appropriate means of enforcing the furmshing
of answers to interrogatories propounded under section 2317.07 would
require first the filing of a motion by the interrogator for an order on the
part of the court, directing that the party to whom the interrogatories
were propounded be required to answer the same. Conceivably, on the
hearing of such a motion, the court could consider any objections or
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reasons which that party might advance as to why he should not be re-
quired to answer any one or more of the interrogatories. If, upon such a
motion, the court directs the party to answer, he could then be adjudged
in contempt of court for failure to comply with an order of the court;
should he then fail to-answer the interrogatories as directed. As a practi-
cal matter in either event, whether answering to interrogatories attached
to a pleading or otherwise, the answers should be filed as a separate
document in the cause and not attached to any pleading.71
Oddly, the methods of enforcing answers to interrogatories emphasize
one more of the advantages to be found in the use of oral depositions in
comparison with written interrogatories, where the power of a notary
public to commit summarily for contempt, as we shall hereafter find, far
exceeds any authority vested in the court itself.
OL AL DEPosiToNs
Introducton
When we turn to the question of the scope and extent of the exami-
nation of an adverse party on oral depositions, we find very few reported
decisions in Ohio. Aside from the problem of privileged communica-
tions, which will be discussed at some length hereafter, it appears that
there is in fact no limitation upon the right to cross-examine an adverse
party on oral deposition, other than the obligation to avoid malicious or
wilfully oppressive interrogation.
It should be borne in mind at the outset that the right to take a depo-
sition is one thing and that, on the other hand, the right to use it is quite
different. The right to take a deposition is an absolute right of either
party to a lawsuit. It depends upon no conditions or qualifications what-
soever other than service of summons upon a defendant in the case. Re-
vised Code 2319.06 provides:
Either party may commence taking testimony by deposition at any time
after service upon the defendant.
In taking advantage of the privileges accorded a plaintiff under this
statute, it is the practice of some plaintiffs' counsel to file with the clerk
of the court, or to leave in the hands of the sheriff, simultaneously with
the filing of the petition, a notice to take depositions and a notary's
subpoena directed to the defendant for the taking of his deposition as
upon cross-examination. From the plaintiff's point of view this practice
has the important practical advantage of giving the defendant the least
possible tune within which to prepare his story or to prepare the defenses
7 See note 50 supra.
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of his case before being called upon to give testimony under cross-exami-
nation. A further circumstance of vital importance is the fact that, ex-
cept for some very recent and very limited restrictions imposed by judi-
cial action, the taking of depositions is in no way under the control of the
court. Depositions are taken in the manner provided by statute before a
notary public, or on occasion, before a master commissioner vested with
the same powers as a notary public. The notary public presides over the
taking of the deposition not by virtue of any authority conferred upon
him by the court, but by virtue of the authority conferred upon him to
that end by statute.
The Court of Appeals of Lucas County correctly analyzed and stated
the situation, declaring:
but the taking of depositions by notaries public is governed by statute,
and the notary public is not appointed by the court or an officer of the
court, nor is he a party to the cause pending in the Common Pleas
Court.
The statutes of Ohio hereinbefore referred to give the notary the power,
authority and processes of law, independent of the trial court, to take
depositions and to punish by proceedings in contempt, a witness who re-
fuses to answer. The notary's powers and processes flow from the statutory
law on the subject - not from the court in which a trial is pending.
This case was cited and specifically followed three years later by the
Probate Court of Ross County.73
Compelling Answers On Oral Depostuon
Before considering the scope of permissible examination or cross-ex-
amination by way of deposition, it may be appropriate to consider first
what may or may not be done to secure answers to questions which a
party or a witness refuses to answer or, on the other hand, to forestall or
to prevent the furmshing of information which a party, witness or coun-
sel believes to be improper.
Revised Code section 147.07, dealing with the powers and junsdic-
tion of notaries public, provides in part:
In-taking depositious, he shall have the power which is by law vested
in justices of the peace to compel the attendance of witnesses and punish
them for refusing to testify.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently clarified this section m the
case of In re Frye:74
' State ex rel. Bechtel v. McCabe, 60 Ohio App. 233, 235, 239, 20 N.E.2d 381, 382,
384 (1938).
" In re Estate of Albert Janes, 20 Ohio Op. 403 (1941)
"' 155 Ouo St. 345, 354, 355, 98 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1951). See also, Ex parte
Bevan, 126 Ohio St. 126, 184 N.E. 393 (1933).
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Since a commissioner or notary public is not invested with the ultimate
authority to pass upon the relevancy, competency or materiality of testimony
taken before him. on deposition, he may order the witness to answer any
question, even though objection is made thereto, subject only to the ex-
clusion of the testimony by the court when offered at the trial.
A witness refuses to answer any question at the risk of commitment for
contempt, even though an answer would infringe any personal privilege
or right granted by the constitution or statutes of the state. If committed
for contempt, the witness is entitled in a habeas corpus proceeding to have
the relevancy and competency of the matters inquired about in taking his
deposition determined by the court.
This same power is vested in a commissioner appointed to take depo-
sitions. In 1943 this question was settled by the Supreme Court of Ohio,
which ruled in what is generally referred to as -the "second Mart= case: 175
A commissioner so appointed has no authority to commit a witness for
contempt for refusal to answer any question unless, after being ordered by
such commissioner to answer, the witness shall unlawfully refuse so to do.
A witness who is not a party has no legal right, upon the taking of his
deposition, to refuse to answer any question, upon the advice of his att-
torney, merely because the attorney believes that the testimony sought is
irrelevant, incompetent or immaterial.
In pronouncing the foregoing rules, the court expressly overruled por-
tions of two earlier decisions.76 Since the commissioner does not possess
the ultimate authority to determine the relevancy, competency or ma-
teriality of testimony taken upon deposition, the court held that the wit-
ness must answer any question when the objection is based upon those
grounds, subject only to the exclusion of such testimony by the trial court.
Under this and many other Ohio decisions, it is dear that either a
party or a witness who is being interrogated by way of deposition has
only one method open to him to test the propriety of any question pro-
pounded to him, or his right to refuse to answer any question. In the
event that a party or witness is committed for contempt by either a notary
or commissioner, the only action available to him is the filing of a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. It was observed by the Supreme Court
of Ohio in its opinion m the Frye case that:
It must be recognized that this is cumbersome procedure with which to
determine the rights and privileges of a witness whose deposition is being
taken before a commissioner appointed by a court or before a notary
publia7
The court then suggested a further method of procedure which, so far
"In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943) (syllabi #3 and #4).
"' The court overruled paragraph four of the syllabus in Ex parte Schoep!, 74 Ohio
St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906), and In re Martin, Jr., 139 Ohio St. 609, 41 N.E.2d
702 (1942).
'In re Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, 355, 98 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1951).
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as we know, has never been resorted to in this state, and which appears
to be of doubtful value and seriously open to question. The court added:
In cases where the nature and subject matter of the testimony sought
by deposition can be anticipated in advance of the taking of the deposition,
a wimess may protect himself from the enforced disclosure of privileged or
harmful matter by an appeal to a court of equity where equitable principles
may be applied in determining the specific rights of the witness. '
Considerable ingenuity would be required in composing a petition for
equitable relief in such a situation, in which the petitioner could only
imagme or "anticipate" the questions that he feared might be propounded
to him in a prospective deposition.
Request by Notary for "Instructtons"
0It should be noted here that in a number of the courts of Ohio, un-
doubtedly and most frequently in Cuyahoga County, a practice has been
followed for many years with the tacit approval of the bench and the bar
which in fact has no proper legal basis. This practice calls for the filing
by the notary public of an application to the court for "instructions" with
respect to the competency or propriety of a question or questions which
the witness has refused to answer. This practice appears to have origi-
nated in 1887 as a result of an opinion by Judge Howard Taft, then a
member of the Superior Court of Cincinnati, later to preside over the
highest court of the land. In that early case Judge Taft noted:
The regular and statutory mode of obtaining the opinion of the court
on such a state of facts is for the notary.to commit the witness for contempt
The witness may then make an application to the court for his re-
lease . , and in considering the application the court must review and
pass upon the ground of commitment.
I am informed however by former members of this court that on the
principle that the notary engaged in taking depositions in a case pending
in this court is as much an officer of the court as a master or a referee ap-
pointed by the court, Notaries have been allowed to consult the court
and obtain an opinion as to the relevancy and competency of a question
put the witness whose deposition is being taken when the witness refuses
to answer.
As pointed out in the more recent decisions previously discussed, ancr
in particular by the Ohio Supreme Court in the Frye case, the judge had!
been misled by Ins associates concerning the status of the notary public
and the power of the court over the notary public. No Ohlo authority-
was cited in support of this practice, but after referring to a decision by-
Ibid.
Shaw v. Oluo Edison Installation Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 809, 17 Week L. Bull.
274 (1887).
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the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Judge Taft added: "This practice seems
to be approved, although under the Code there is no such provision."8 0
Beginning with a decision in 1901 by the Court of Common Pleas of
Hamilton County in the case of In re Miller,8 the absence of any legal
foundation for this practice was noted and its use has been uniformly re-
jected by the courts. This decision is one of the most careful, thorough
and well-reasoned opinions to be found on the general subject of the tak-
ing of depositions, the scope of depositions and the power, authority and
conduct of notaries public. After noting earlier supreme court decisions
holding that a notary has no power to determine whether a question
which the witness has refused to answer is relevant, the court discussed
the practice invoked by Judge Taft:
This would be the proper practice were the notary an officer of the
court, as the master or referee appointed by the court of chancery was to the
latter court. But the notary is not. He is an independent officer, ap-
pointed by the governor, has no connection with and is not under the con-
trol of the courts, nor would he be bound by the instructions of the court,
but could totally disregard them. The only way therefore in which a wit-
ness can hope to have his rights established is to go to jail, and then have
counsel sue out a writ of habeas corpus, bring his body before the court
and have the latter pass upon the propriety of the question.
Such an anomaly in our jurisprudence requires correction,
In the later case of In re Estate of Albert Janes,83 an application was
made by a notary public to the Probate Court of Ross County for instruc-
tions as to whether or not a witness should be required to answer certain
questions. In this connection the court stated:
Upon reason and authority therefore it seems clearly established that
applicant is not an officer of this court, that applicant's power to take depo-
sitions and punish for contempt is independent of this court and amply
provided for by statute, and no other statutory method having been pro-
vided therefore as a consequence it follows that this court is without
jurisdiction to grant said application. (Emphasis added)."
Fifty-five years after the Hamilton County court found that this pro-
cedure was "such an anomaly in our jurisprudence (as to require) cor-
rection," and for the first and only time within that period of more than
a half century, the Cuyahoga County Bar Association, in 1955, prepared
and caused to be introduced in the 101st General Assembly of Ohio two
bills -one to provide for the scope of testimony which might be taken
80Ibui.
818 Ohio N.P. 142, 11 Ohio Dec. 69 (1901), aft'd, 65 Ohio St. 128, 61 N.E. 701
(1901).
'Id. at 145, 11 Ohio Dec. at 75, 76.
8820 Ohio Op. 403 (1941).
" Id. at 405.
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on deposition and a second to provide a method of enforcement for the
taking of testimony upon deposition.85 It is anticipated that these bills
will again be introduced in 1957 in the 102nd General Assembly and that
the Legislature will find that they fill a serious gap in existing discovery
practice and procedure. If adopted, they will do away with the cumber-
'sH.B. 785, 101st General Assembly (1955) "Any party and any witness, may be
examined upon the taking of a deposition with respect to any matter, not privileged
by statute or by the Constitution of Ohio or of the United States, which is relevant
to the subject matter of any action or proceeding, or relevant to the claims of any
party to such action or proceeding, whether such matter relates to the claim or de-
fense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condi-
tion, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things known to the
person being examined.
"Upon interrogation, in the course, of such deposition, of any witness or party,
with respect to the identity and location of any person or persons having knowledge
of relevant facts concerning the subject matter of the action or proceeding or the
claims of any party to such action or proceeding, such witness or party shall be re-
quired to state the identity and the location of such person or persons whenever the
identity and location of such person or persons is known to the witness or to the
party or to an agent or counsel of such party. Knowledge of any agent, employee or
counsel of a corporate party concerning the identity and location of such person or
persons shall be regarded as knowledge of the party with respect thereto."
H.B. 784, 101st General Assembly (1955) "A witness or a party to an action or
proceeding shall respond to all questions propounded to him upon direct examnma-
non and cross-exanmination.
"In the event a witness or a party fails or refuses, upon advice of counsel, or for
any other reason, to respond to a question propounded to him on direct or cross-
examination, such witness or party shall thereby be in contempt of the court or
administrative board before which the action or proceeding is pending.
"The power to punish a witness or party for such contempt is vested in the
notary public or commissioner before whom the examination is being conducted,
subject to the limitations upon the authority of the notary public or commissioner
imposed by law. Such power, however, shall not be exercised before the expiration
of ten days following the hearing at which such contempt takes place.
"Within a period of ten days from the date of a hearing during which a witness
or a party is m contempt for failure or refusal to respond to a question or questions
propounded to such witness or party, he may be purged of contempt by filing with
the court or administrative board before whom the action or proceeding is pending
an application for that purpose.
"The court or board may purge the applicant of contempt if it finds, with respect
to the question or questions which the applicant has failed or refused to answer:
1) The question is wholly irrelevant and immaterial to the subject matter
of the action or proceeding and to the claims of any of the parties to such action
or proceeding and does not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
2) The information sought to be elicited is privileged by statute or under
the Constitution of Ohio or of the United States.
3) The information sought to be elicited relates to secret processes, develop-
ments or research which need not be disclosed.
4) The examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the applicant or a party to the ac-
ton or proceeding.
"Such application shall be heard and determined promptly."
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some and clearly anomalous procedure for the protection of witnesses
which has been followed for almost a century.
Duty of a Witness
As the law now stands it is the absolute duty of a witness to answer
a question propounded to him on a deposition, providing the information
sought to be elicited is not privileged. Perhaps the leading case announc-
ing this rule is DeCamp v. Archibald,6 decided by the Supreme Court of
Ohio over sixty years ago, in which the rule was announced in the
syllabus:
Where the question propounded involves no question of privilege on
the part of the witness it is his duty to answer if ordered by the notary to
do so. The question of its competency is a matter for the determination
of the court on the trial of the action in which the evidence is taken, and if
he refuses to do so he may be committed as a contumacious witness.
The reader may wish to, and should compare this decision with that
in the second Martn case, and with other more recent decisions. Again,
however, let it not be said that those who, by virtue of circumstances, are
forced to adopt an opposite view are without support or authority. Those
lawyers will prefer to cite and rely upon the case of Ex parte Jennings,87
a decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio rendered in a habeas corpus
proceeding, in which the court said in its opimon:
The language of the section conferring authority upon the officer to
punish a witness for refusing to answer "when lawfully ordered" implies
that punishment cannot be imposed for every refusal. The law has not
invested such officers with arbitrary and omnipotent power to compel a
witness to answer all questions however incompetent, irrelevant, imma-
terial or inadmissible. The refusal to answer such questions is not neces-
sarily a contempt.
We do not suppose that any interest which the witness may have in
concealing the facts which the question propounded was designed to elicit
would excuse him from answering if the facts were relevant to the issues
on trial; nor that the sincerity of his belief that the facts were irrelevant
would shield him from imprisonment if the court should be of the opinion
that they are relevant. If he refuses to answer upon the ground that the
answer is incompetent he does so at his peril. It seems, however, entirely
clear that in this case the opinion of the witness as to the irrelevancy of the
question is correct.
Perhaps a party or a witness, or counsel for a party or witness refusing
to answer a question on deposition may take some comfort from the
Jentntngs case. It appears, however, that the comfort may be somewhat
cold, since the court has the last guess concermng the relevancy or ma-
teriality of the question. The decision in the Jenimngs case was put very
"50 Ohio St. 618, 35 N.E. 1056 (1893) (syllabus #3).
760 Ohio St. 319, 328, 331, 54 N.E. 262. 263 (1899).
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largely upon a question of personal privilege. In this regard, this case
has not been expressly overruled. However, it should be noted that many
of the specific pronouncements have been subsequently discredited, par-
ticularly in the second Martn case.
Generally speaking it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a
court to rule upon the relevancy or materiality of questions propounded
during -the course of a deposition, if they appear to have even a remote
connection with the subject matter of the suit or any of the issues raised.
At the tme of trial a court may rule upon the question of relevancy or
materiality with some degree of assurance, having before it the testimony
of all the witnesses or at least some adequate knowledge of what that
testimony will be, rather than the testimony of the single witness whose
conduct is in question. It is to be hoped that the procedure suggested by
the Cuyahoga County Bar Association will relieve the courts of most of
these troublesome questions.
In an early decision by a trial court of Hamilton County, which was
rendered during the same year in which the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in the Archibald case, the trial judge arrived at the same con-
clusion subsequently expressed by the Supreme Court in the Jennings
case.
88
When a witness refuses to answer, the cause of the commitment is a
refusal to answer when lawfully ordered. He cannot be lawfully ordered
to answer unless the question put to him is pertinent and relevant to the
issue in the case. To specify particularly the cause of commitment in such
case the order must show that the witness refused to answer a pertinent
and relevant question and to do that it should set out facts enough to make
it appear on the face of the order that the question asked was pertinent
and relevant.
If the" observation of the judge in the foregoing case correctly states
what is required of a notary public who is committing a witness for con-
tempt for refusal to answer a question, we find the existence of a some-
what vicious round robin, in which it is somewhat difficult to determine
who is the victim. It appears from the cases already referred to that a
party or witness refuses at his peril to answer a question put to him on a
deposition. But what of the notary public who is obliged to commit a
witness for contempt for refusal to answer a supposedly pertinent or
relevant question when the notary himself has no authority to determine
whether the question is pertinent and relevant? Does he not also act
at his peril in committing a witness for contempt under such circum-
stances, leaving himself open to a possible claim of false imprisonment
if it should turn out that the commitment was not justified? Such con-
'Ex p arte Woodworth, 6 Ohio Dec. 19, 21 (1893).
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siderations make it all the more remarkable that this procedure has existed
in Ohio for a century without correction.
In 1942 the Ohio Supreme Court decided the first Martsn case,89 in
which the court held that it was
error for the Ohio court in the habeas corpus proceeding to deny a
hearing to a witness on the relevancy and competency of the question asked,
for refusal to answer which the witness was committed; such denial of a
hearing constitutes a denial of remedy by due course of law and violates the
witness' constitutional rights.
However, a short time after the decision in the first Martn case, the
complexion of the court was altered. The opinion in that case was writ-
ten by Judge Bettman and Judges Turner, Hart and Matthias concurred.
Chief Justice Weygandt and Judge Zimmerman dissented. Just one
year later, with two new judges on the bench, the decision in the first
fartn case was reversed, and the court held that a witness had no right
to a determination of the relevancy or pertinency of a question in a
habeas corpus proceeding. In the second Martn case the majority opinion
was written -by Judge Bell, and this tune the Chief Justice and Judge
Zimmerman, together with Judge Williams were on the majority. Judges
Turner, Hart and Matthias, who had been on the majority in the first
Martn case, now constituted the dissenting minority. In the second
Martin case a number of reasons, eminently sound, were advanced in sup-
port of the decision. Among them were the following:
To hold that a witness could decide for himself upon the relevancy
of a question against the opinion of the judge presiding or the officer
taking the deposition would be subversive of all order in judicial proceed-
ings.
Relevancy relates to the scope of the investigation and therefore is the
concern of the parties alone. The recognition of a privilege of this sort
would add innumerable opportunities to make a claim of privilege and
would thus tend to complicate a trial. The opinion of the witness that
the question is irrelevant is entitled to no consideration. If that is Ins
only objection to answering there can be no injury result to him from
compelling him to answer. If questions are improperly asked they must
be answered subject however to be excluded whenever such testimony
shall be offered in any legal proceeding. By such a course the law is mag-
nified and rendered efficient and effectual and the just and lawful rights
of all parties fully protected. ®
The court quoted from a decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa,l
emphasizing its agreement, with the following observations:
Even though many of the questions propounded were subject to objec-
tion properly interposed, which objections would undoubtedly have been
In re Martin, Jr., 139 Ohio St. 609, 41 NE.2d 702 (1942) (syllabus).
'In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 98, 47 N.E.2d 388, 393 (1943).
'
1Finn v. Winneshiek District Court, 145 Iowa 157, 123 N.W 1066 (1909).
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considered and made effective upon the trial of the case, this was no reason
in itself why the witness should not have answered them when before the
commissioner. It would be intolerable to hold that a witness whose tests-
mony is being taken by deposition may refuse to answer, have the propriety
of the question determined by the court, and upon an adverse ruling bring
the case to this court and delay and prolong the trial of ihe case upon
its merits indefirutely'
The court thus concluded in the second Marztz case that the commissioner
properly requested the witness to answer certain questions, and that the
witness was guilty of an unlawful r'efsal to answer and was therefore
properly committed for contempt.
It should be pointed out, however, that there was a strong dissenting
opinion in this case, and that both the first and second Martm decisions
were rendered by a court divided four-to-three. The specific issue before
the court in those cases has not been presented to the supreme court
since 1943. Since the court directly reversed its position in the space of
one year, it would be impossible to predict what the attitude of a new
majority might be at any particular tUne.93
The writer believes the decision in the second Martun case to be logical
and correct. In order to determine whether a particular question or a
series of questions propounded to a witness were relevant or material to
the issues in a lawsuit, the parties might well be compelled to produce a
great mass of evidence for the sole purpose of convincing the judge in
a habeas corpus case as to the relevancy of such questions to the issues in
the lawsuit, which had not yet been tried. There is no justification for a
prolonged and completely ancillary contest of this nature.
Subpoena Duces Tecum
Not only is a witness obliged to appear and to testify, but he is equally
obliged to obey the subpoena of a notary public to bring with him what-
ever books or records in the possession or custody of the witness may be
demanded.
This rule was announced by the supreme court in 1901 in the case
of In re Rauh.94 In that case a subjoena was issued to a merchant with
whom the defendant in an action had been doing business, and the wit-
ness was directed to produce books of his own business disclosing his
transactions with the defendant, which the witness refused to do. The
court held that the witness could be compelled to produce the records,
stating:
'In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 100, 47 N.E.2d 388, 394 (1943).
' See, for example, In re Grosswiller, 47 Ohio App. 409, 191 N.E. 910 (1934).
"65 Ohio St. 128, 61 N.E. 701 (1901).
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Whether or not the substance of the deposition is incompetent is to be
left to the subsequent determination of the court, as is also the question
whether a command to produce books, papers or other thing under the con-
trol of the witness relates to such books, writings or other thing as he may
be compelled to produce.
If the witness assumes to decide these questions for himself at the time,
unless the interrogatory involves a question of privilege, he must do so at
his peril. If he should be right in his decision he would lose nothing,
if wrong he must suffer the consequences.
It is submitted that this decision also is modified and extended by the
decision in the second Martin case and that, barring the existence of pri-
vilege, a witness must produce any documents or records for which a
subpoena has been issued.
It should be recalled that the Ohio Supreme Court in the second Mar-
tm case overruled one of the principles announced -by the court in the
case of Ex parte Schoepf,96 decided in 1906. In the Schoepf case the
supreme court, for the first tune, explicitly held that where a question or
a document was not pertinent to the issues, or "not material or necessary
to make out the case of the party calling for it or is incompetent," the
witness could not lawfully be ordered to answer the question or produce
the document. This is no longer true as a result of the second Martn
decision, and it should be recognized that several lower court decisions
no longer state the existing law in Ohio.
9 7
Three years after its decision in the second Maron case, the supreme
court decided the case of In re Bott.98 The case is an important one
and we place it on the credit side of the ledger in an appraisal of a
number of decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, to which reference
will now be made. The syllabus holds:
A party to an action may through proper subpoena issued by a notary
public compel an adverse party to produce before the notary as evidence
specified papers and documents in the adverse party's possession, and if he
refuses to produce such papers and documents for no other reason than
that his refusal is on advice of counsel, he may, after having been in-
structed by the notary to produce them, be committed for contempt for
such refusal.
An officer of a corporation having in his possession and custody books
and papers of such corporation, which are described in a subpoena duces
tecum directed to him, must produce such books or papers upon proper de-
mand or be held in contempt for refusal to do som '
-Id. at 135, 136, 61 N.E. at 702.
" 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906)
'Solanics v. Republic Steel Corp., 5 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 152 (1940);
Jones v. Goode, 7 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 589 (1906).
'* 146 Ohio St. 511, 66 N.E.2d 918 (1946). See also, Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911).
'In re Bott, 146 Ohio St. 511, 66 N.E.2d 918 (1946) (syllabi #1 and #2).
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In that case Botr had been in the employ of The Consumers Home
Equipment Company, engaged in the sale of household furnishings and
equipment at retail by solicitation from door to door. While he was so
employed a competitive company was organized by two other persons, also
named with Bott as defendants, who had formerly been employed by
Consumers. The plaintiff laimed that its place of business had been
burglarized and valuable merchandise stolen, and claimed that this mer-
chandise had been taken by Bott and, subsequently, turned over to the
new competitive company, of which Bott became president. A subpoena
duces tecum served on Bort required him to produce salesmen's slips and
collectors' route cards showing the sales over a specified period. On
advice of counsel for the company, of which Bot was president, he de-
clined to produce these records. Following a commitment for contempt,
the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County granted his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. The plaintiff corporation, although not a party to the
habeas corpus proceeding, filed an appeal to the supreme court and a
motion to dismiss that appeal was overruled. By a unanimous decision,
the ruling of the appellate court was reversed. It should be noted that
no daim was made in that case that the documents subpoenaed were in-
competent or irrelevant. The court added, however, the following im-
portant declaration:
But the witness has no immunity if the testimony or production of
documents does not involve self-incriminanon or privileged communica-
tion and the objection is merely to the competence or relevancy of the evi-
dence sought.
Corporations are not entitled to all the constitutional immunities and
protections in private security which private individuals have in such
matters. Hence, an officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce its
records in his possession, upon the plea that they either will incriminate
him or may incrinmnate it. In assuming their custody he has accepted
the incident obligation to permit inspection.'
Considering this question further, we find one of those anomalies
in reported Ohio cases - namely, a decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals for Hamilton County three years after the decision by the Su-
preme Court in the Bott case, which cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court decision and appears to -be dearly contrary - in re Deye.10'
That was an action against a corporation for an accounting of profits
claimed to be due to the owner of a building in which the corporation
had installed certain electrical equipment, which it was employing to
furnish electricity to other tenants of the building. Deye, who was the
president of the defendant company, received a subpoena to produce cer-
SId. at 517, 518, 66 N.E.2d at 921, 922.
'Inre Deye, 85 Ohio App. 302, 88 N.E.2d 60 (1949)
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tam books and records relating to the income of the company from the
sale of electric current on the premises belonging to the plaintiff. He
refused to produce the records for the reason, as stated by the witness,
that they related to "privileged business, it is my business in which he
has no interest." In its opinion the appellate court declared:
No more typical case could be presented illustrating the injustice of
requiring a corporation to produce, through a subpoena duces tecum issued
to an officer, a mass of books and papers wholly irrelevant to any issue that
could be presented by the pleadings in existence at the time the subpoena
was issued.
While the right of the notary to pass upon matters of relevancy and
materiality may be limited, and Ins obligation to commit mandatory, cer-
tainly, when it is made to appear to a court in a habeas corpus proceeding
that the books and papers involved have no relevant connection with the
issues presented by the pleadings, it would be a travesty on justice if a court
should be required to sustain a commitment based upon a refusal to produce
that which it, as a court, would be bound to exclude as not being material
and relevant evidence."'
It is dear that there is no difference in principle between the situa-
tion before the court in the Deye case and the facts in the Martn case.
There the court held that a witness has no right to refuse to answer ques-
tions put to him because, as he claims, the questions are irrelevant or m-
competent. Also, a court, in a habeas corpus proceeding, may not inquire
into those claims of the witness under the rationale of the second Martin
case. It appears to be dearly a difference in degree only, and not a dif-
ference in kind or in principle, where the objection of the witness is
based upon the alleged irrelevancy or incompetency of a document sought
to be produced through him, instead of his oral testimony alone. The
court in the Deye case concluded its opinion with the following pro-
nouncement:
In the instant case, the witness having been called as on cross-examina-
tion, and being the president of the defendant corporation, had the right to
question the relevancy and materiality of the books and papers of the de-
fendant corporation, which he was ordered to produce.
We find in this case a classic example of a situation which so fre-
quently confronts trial counsel, to their dismay. The court has made up
its mind as to what, in its opinion, the decision in the case should be.
Notwithstanding the decision three years earlier m the Bott case, involv-
ing also a president of a corporation called on cross-examination to pro-
duce books and records of the company, in which the supreme court
held that the only ground the officer might rely on for refusal to produce
"°
2Id. at 307, 308, 88 N.E.2d at 63.
' Id. at 309, 88 N.E.2d at 63, 64.
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the records was the ground of privilege, the court proceeded to fashion
its opinion m complete disregard of an apparently controlling decision.
In a subsequent article, the author will discuss matters of privileged
communications relating to discovery practice, and also discovery under
the Federal Rules. This evaluation will indicate further impediments
which have been erected by the Ohio courts to full and effective use of
discovery procedure, and the manner in which all parties may be afforded
an equal opportunity to obtain facts pertinent to the lawsuit.
